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Editorial
The views expressed in this editorial are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Canadian Medical Association or its subsidiaries,
the journal’s editorial board or the Canadian College of Neuropsychopharmacology.

The Bayesian brain and cooperative communication
in schizophrenia
Lena Palaniyappan, MBBS, PhD; Ganesan Venkatasubramanian, MD, PhD
The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states…;
they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect but are one and the
same thing…. The action of the body is nothing but the act of will ….
translated into perception. – Arthur Schopenhauer, 18191
Our social world is an ever-changing milieu in which
boundless verbal and nonverbal signals are generated by fellow humans. To ensure our survival, we must perceive certain regularities from the complexity that surrounds us. A
failure to meet this daily challenge may prove costly for
some; social encounters trigger several psychiatric symptoms, while social withdrawal reduces their intensity, at least
temporarily. 2 For example, disorganization (or formal
thought disorder), one of the central features of schizophrenia, presents primarily as a disruption in cooperative communication that occurs in a social context. Though many
technical advances now allow us to study “socially” interacting agents in the laboratory (for example, see Kingsbury and
colleagues3), psychiatric symptoms are rarely studied in the
context of neural mechanisms of social encounters. To tackle
this challenge, we need empirical tools to study the dynamic
neural framework of social interaction, starting from a
2-person perspective. In this editorial, we first present such a
tool: an emerging “active inference” perspective of cooperative communication between 2 individuals. We then introduce the 2-brain problem of formal thought disorder in
schizophrenia as an exemplar case of its utility and map
resulting theoretical expectations to known signs of this construct. Lastly, we highlight several experimental opportun
ities that arise from casting of formal thought disorder in the
active inference framework.

Brain as a Bayesian organ
One of the important pursuits of clinical neuroscience is to
explain how computational failures of the brain result in
symptoms and signs experienced by patients. To get here, we
need a framework on how the brain is employed to compute
solutions for the challenges (e.g., recognizing an object or
talking to a stranger) it purports to solve. One biologically
plausible unifying hypothesis casts the brain as a Bayesian

Box 1. Definition
The term “Bayesian” refers to the process of assigning probabilities
based on prior knowledge when interpreting data.

statistical organ whose function is to generate and refine
models of the hidden properties of the world (i.e., causes and
consequences) in order to reduce uncertainty4 (Box 1). Accordingly, the brain’s models of the world are predictions (or
“priors”) held by neuronal units, while perceptions are inferences that arise from the probability estimations of sensory
data against models. When the senses convey data that are
not explained by the held models (“prediction errors”), this
leads to either further data gathering (e.g., attending to the
object or acting on the environment) or a model revision to
reduce further prediction errors. In this framework, actions
fulfill behavioural predictions; they simply arise from the
drive to reduce the error between the predicted future (prior
“expectations”) and current motor states.5 This idea, termed
“active inference,” provides an algorithm for perceptions and
actions,6 which, combined with a plausible implementational
sketch of neural circuits (dynamic causal models; not discussed here, but see Petzschner and colleagues7 and Limongi
and colleagues8 for examples), opens the door for parsimonious mechanistic explanations for psychiatric symptoms.

Precision-driven active inference
To function as a statistical engine, the brain needs to overcome
2 challenges: model selection and significance detection. First,
as the sensory world is infinite, it is not plausible to instantly
scan the entire model space to select a model to fit the incoming data. This is solved by a hierarchical framework of prediction propagation wherein specific model choice is dictated by
the immediately higher level of predictive representations.9
For example, when we perceive what is being said by the person speaking to us in a noisy bar (“Would you like one more
of the same?”), our models are progressively constrained by
the situation (the bar), the speaker (the bartender who knows
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you by name), the context (having a recently emptied glass),
and the event (running a tab). Second, many a time, there is
likely to be a mismatch between our expectations (prior
models) and sensations (sensory data); this mismatch, termed
“prediction error,” can be a “chance occurrence” due to inaccuracies in the data we gathered. The brain, as an optimal
Bayesian machine, must allow only the “reliable” prediction
errors to propagate further, and trigger model revision or further data acquisition (as these are expensive).
If the sensory data are noisy and highly variable, then any
information in that data that we did not predict with our
prior models cannot be trusted. The prediction error triggered from processing these data will be considered to be unreliable or less precise (i.e., precision is the inverse of the variance). We can say that an unreliable prediction error is given
less importance (or weighting) over the prior predictions,
and the prior model is retained. Similarly, our prior models
themselves also have variable degrees of precision; we cannot always rely on our models. Ultimately, for every encounter with some form of incoming data, our inferential bias
toward our models (priors) versus data should be dictated by
the reliability (or precision) of these 2 sources. In effect, this
reliability is the learned probability of success of a model
from previous experiences of deploying the model. To put it
simply, if the brain is a flawless statistical organ, then any
“significant effect” that it detects from the gathered data
must be based on both the magnitude of the signal (deviation
of the data from prior model) and the reliability (inverse variance) of both the data and the model.
Several lines of evidence indicate that precision is encoded
by the brain (arguably, at the synaptic level) and is used to
assign weight to sensory data (in the form of prediction
errors as they ascend) as well as priors (in the form of predictions that descend).10,11 At times when our predictions are imprecise, for example, if a new bartender with an accent is
speaking to us in a noisy environment, we either ask him to
repeat what he said, move closer, tilt our head and pay more
attention to his voice, or stubbornly stick to our expectations.
In other words, in a volatile world where model revisions are
often required, we either commit neural resources to improve
the precision of sensory data (attentional selection12) or inflate
the emphasis toward our predictions (confidence13). A similar
process also operates for motor behaviour; when the consequences of a planned act are highly variable, we can still bias
toward selecting an action by increasing precision afforded to
a chosen policy or plan (i.e., increased commitment or motivation14). Note that this line of conceptualization brings us
close to Schopenhauer’s assertion: action is nothing, but will
translates to perception. This statement indeed foresees the
perception–action loop articulated by active inference
whereby action can be seen as the realization of motivated
motor prediction.
The precision-driven active inference framework has been
invoked in multiple transdiagnostic studies, including some
published in JPN,15,16 to explain abnormalities in perception,17
interoception18 and emotional expression,19 to name a few.
Here, we theoretically expand its application to disrupted communication in psychosis as a clinical phenomenon of interest.

Active inference and cooperative communication
The basic premise of active inference is that our interactions
with the world are attempts to reduce the uncertainty about the
models we hold of it. In our social world, the most critical uncertainty is the mental state of those we interact with. Speech is
a crucial act by which we interact with our social world. The
process of engaging in a discourse with another person involves both perception and action; this can be understood as an
active inference process jointly deployed by the speakers to decrease their respective uncertainties about each other’s mental
state.20 We achieve this by asking and answering questions
directly to infer each other’s “model of the world.”21
For cooperative communication to occur, the 2 brains’ causal
models and expectations should have a certain degree of alignment22,23 (see also Kingsbury and colleagues24). Language, by
its very nature, provides these shared tools at several levels of
the hierarchical priors (phonetics, semantics, syntax).25 Other
features, such as culture, shared identity and common context,
also provide higher-level alignment for shared message passing.26 This sort of prior alignment is said to be species-specific
and adaptive, making cooperative communication less
demanding and more likely to occur in our social world.20
Brown and Kuperberg argue that predictive processes operate hierarchically across 3 levels in the generative model of language — semantic selection, syntactic construction and phonological articulation.9 Thus, higher-order priors (e.g., subject of
interest to be discussed) hierarchically constrain the choice of
downstream action sequences (e.g., ideas, sentences, words) to
achieve the desired outcome of a social discourse. The hier
archical generative process is subject to internal (comparing the
lower-level selections against the discourse plan and the message, to make changes as we speak) and external monitoring
(comparing intended and achieved perceptual consequences of
the output) at each level. Once a discourse is initiated, the further choice of messages and the structure and the length of
responses depend on this self-monitoring feedback from articulation as well as the feedback from the listener (other monitoring). Both the verbal and nonverbal outputs from the self and
the other person are crucial for this feedback process.
But what prompts a change in our planned discourse? Our
individual beliefs (probability estimates) about the most socially
valuable message choice tune the commitment placed on our
discourse plan, and this in turn affects the precision afforded to
the syntactic, lexical and phonetic choices down the hierarchy
that we employ to convey the message (propagation of precision). Sufficiently precise priors at each level are required for the
discourse not to drift on the basis of incoming cues; this also
considerably increases the speed of action selection and implementation (i.e., winning combination chosen at an optimal
psychomotor speed; see Parr and colleagues27 for limb movements). Through precision modulation, we afford sufficient
commitment to the ongoing discourse plan, thus attenuating the
relative impact of the sensory feedback. When the other person
generates sufficiently precise output (for the speaker, this is
feedback) that overcomes this commitment, we revise the on
going speech production (e.g., changing the topic when we
detect a reliable sign of displeasure).
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hallucinations).33 Nevertheless, unlike discrete language disorders such as aphasia, the hierarchical representations that form
linguistic structure are affected in a reversed gradient.34 In
schizophrenia, the pragmatics are affected more than semantic
and syntactic levels, while the phonemic choices are mostly unaffected.34,35 Cohesive ties in a discourse are not preserved
(positive FTD: distractibility, tangentiality, derailment, peculiar
word choices) and verbal productivity diverges from context
ual requirements (negative FTD: reduced speech, weakened
goal, perseveration). These communication deficits play a crit
ical role in long-term functional deficits.36,37
In an attempt to explain language comprehension and production abnormalities in schizophrenia, Brown and Kuperberg
hypothesized “a breakdown of generative circuits linking highlevel message representations and lexical representations’’ and a
failure of the time-sensitive predictive processing (whereby
priors are accessible only after the bottom–up inputs are fully
accessed) as the basis of positive FTD in schizophrenia.9 We extend these ideas to accommodate the social context of normal
discourse (i.e., the 2-brain problem). In placing emphasis on
2 brains rather than 1 brain, we underscore that the neural processes pertaining to both individuals partaking in a conversation
influence the “organization” or coherence. Thus, the processes
that lead to verbal disorganization or FTD are best studied with
both “brains” considered together, rather than seeking individual brain–symptom correlations as we practise at present.

In summary, cooperative human communication fits well
with the active inference algorithm. Two speakers engage in a
discourse to infer each other’s mental state, thus reducing the uncertainty about each other. Based on their probabilistic estimates
(beliefs), they choose messages, discourse structure, and lexical
choices with maximum likelihood to serve the goal of “reverse
inferring” the other person’s mental state from the expected
responses. The top–down conditional dependence of the subprocesses means that if the goal to infer the other person’s mental
state is imprecise, this reduces the precision of message selection
and the implemented discourse plan, as we discuss below.

Thought and language disorder in schizophrenia
Traditionally, linguistic abnormalities in schizophrenia have
been considered as a part of a notable symptom cluster often
termed “formal thought disorder” (FTD) or “disorganization,”
while later the emphasis shifted to “speech disorder.”28 These
debates arise from a “Cartesian” approach that sees language as
merely an expressive system that encodes an independently
constituted thought process. Recent developments in generative
linguistics have emphasized an interactive interface between
thought and language; in this Un-Cartesian approach, language
and thought are seen as indissociable;29 this approach eschews
the thought versus language versus speech disorder problem in
understanding schizophrenia.30 When extending to the thought
versus speech disorder issue in schizophrenia, the Un-Cartesian
approach is also compatible with Schopenhauer (will v. act) and
the active inference framework (prediction v. behaviour).
For some, FTD is essentially a 2-brain problem, and schizophrenia is primarily a disorder of communication.31,32 Disrupted speech arises from the speaker using ideas, words and
phrases in such a way that their meanings are not socially
shared.32 Several psychotic symptoms can be traced back to
how the patient employs language to communicate (delusions,

What is she
thinking?

An active inference account of discourse in
schizophrenia
Several lines of evidence argue for a deficiency in precision
modulation in schizophrenia.38,39 Within the hierarchical generative models of cooperative communication, we propose that a
gradient of a precision modulation deficit affecting the highest
levels of priors exists in patients with schizophrenia (Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. A gradient of a precision modulation deficit affecting the highest levels of priors in schizophrenia is hypothesized to result in speech
disturbances in social settings. When demands arise, patients cannot afford increased precision to their higher-order “adaptive” priors. When
engaging a second person, this imprecision presents as a failure of commitment to a discourse plan (or narrative) with low confidence on the
message choice that increases the likelihood of frequent shifts in conversational goal, messages and speech structure.
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When demands arise, patients cannot afford increased precision to their higher-order priors. When engaging a second person, this imprecision presents as a failure of commitment to a
discourse plan40 with low confidence on the message choice
(ambivalence). This state of low precision of higher-order priors makes all lower-level models equally likely for selection;41
this increases the likelihood of frequent shifts in conversational
goal, messages and speech structure (loosened associations:
derailment, incoherence).
The presence of imprecise priors at various higher levels of
active inference considerably reduces the speed of message
selection (reduced spontaneity) and implementation (reduced
rate of speech). The relatively low precision of priors compared
with sensory data enables external cues to repeatedly redirect
the discourse (distractibility). The between-speaker asymmetry
in the precision of shared priors, and the unpredictable shifts in
the discourse increases the interlocutor’s uncertainty about the
speaker’s mental state, who loses the conversational rapport
(and is left with a “Praecox feeling”42). The external cues of this
uncertainty are available to the speaker, but owing to the difficulty in precision affordance to the higher-order priors, the
speaker presses on with the same imprecise stream of com
munication (circumstantiality, empty speech with little information). Nevertheless, as the precision afforded to lower-level
priors is relatively preserved, this leads to word-level errors
(repetitions, perseveration, persisting with peculiar word
choices) and vague references. Further, the imbalance in the
dyad’s relative precisions (of higher-order priors) also precludes the speakers from taking appropriate turns,23 leading to
conversational failures. This precision-weighting imbalance
also means that, after a few exchanges, the information flow becomes lopsided. Such asymmetric exchanges arising from nonaligned priors lead to the conclusion that the patient did not infer the mental state of the other speaker.43,44 In due course, the
expectation that a social discourse can assist in inferring the
other person’s mental state diminishes greatly, as it turns out to
be a costly exercise with low returns. This is especially likely if
the other person also has imprecise conversational priors.45
One’s estimated probability of causally influencing the immediate social world reduces over time, driving down any further
active inference via speech/action (diminished expressivity,
negative symptoms46 over the longer time course).
How does this imprecision of priors come about? First, precise priors emerge when large amounts of data have been sampled, with reinforcement of choices (termed “confidence accumulation” in decisional neuroscience47); for language, this is a
developmental challenge,48 which when not met, increases the
chance of priors to operate with lower precision. Second,
Adams and colleagues49 argue a primary role for the glutamatergic system in maintaining synaptic gain and modulating
precision; several empirical observations support a role for
glutamatergic hypofunction in schizophrenia.50 Third, it is possible that patients perceive the social environment to be more
volatile,51 thus estimating the consequences of their action
plans to be less reliable than others. This can also arise from
developmental adversities (trauma, bullying52) or experiences
of significant shifts in social contexts (as in immigration).
While the associations we make here are currently speculative,

experimental determination of precision weighting of different
levels of priors during social conversation is entirely plausible,
in line with similar studies in perceptual processing.53
Recent observations indicate that noradrenergic neuro
modulation may affect the precision of our priors;54 thus,
stressful states where adrenergic arousal is high may reduce
reliance on (i.e., precision weighting of) priors. In contrast,
dopamine may play a crucial role in precision weighting of
prediction errors, rather than coding predictions per se,55
while nondopaminergic modulators such as acetylcholine
may affect the weighting of higher-order priors.56,57 Thus, a
hyperdopaminergic state (as seen in some patients with psychosis58) may increase the rate at which the speech production
priors are revised, further adding to their uncertainty. D2blockers may reduce error-induced shifts in the discourse
plan, correcting the positive FTD features, but cannot improve
the (nondopaminergically mediated) precision of the higherorder discourse plan per se, and the eventual gravitation
toward reduced speech output (negative FTD), as seen in the
long term. More broadly, neuromodulatory aberrations in the
higher-level association cortex result in excitation/inhibition
imbalance that underwrites precision modulation38 as well as
FTD59 in schizophrenia. Specific brain regions, such as anter
ior insula,60 dorsal anterior cingulate cortex61 and hippocampus,62 appear to play a key part in precision-weighting mech
anisms; the course of FTD may relate to the volumetric63 and
connectivity64,65 changes of these regions in schizophrenia. It is
important to note that irrespective of the location of lesions,
the hierarchical precision-weighting framework enables propagation of failures at 1 level to the other levels of speech generation (see Palaniyappan66 for further discussion on the
broader systems theory notion in psychosis).
In summary, FTD can be cast as a problem of precision
modulation of higher-order priors during dyadic social
e ncounters. This view concurs with that of Brown and
Kuperberg,9 who also proposed a role for imprecise priors
(message-level predictions) and the resulting over-
adjustment of the production plan. Our extension emphasizes a mismatch in the precision of shared priors in the
speaker and listener as a crucial component of communication failure, and an inability to afford precision to discourse
plans when demands arise (e.g., in a volatile social context)
as a critical deficit in schizophrenia. Our model explains both
positive and negative FTD and accommodates their trajectory
and treatment response.

Putting ideas to test
The active inference account of communication deficits presented here casts many elements of FTD as a 2-brain problem of social inference. As such, scientific scrutiny of this
theory mandates ecologically valid experiments to build
empirical evidence. Psycholinguistic studies in psychosis
generally focus on lexical or sentence-level processing rather
than dialogic interactions; novel insights on communication
emerge when natural conversation is studied, even at a
s ingle-brain level (for example see Castellucci and colleagues67). Second-person paradigms (e.g., hyperscanning to
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Box 2. The fallacy of brain as a computer
Throughout this editorial, we take the stance of considering the brain as
a statistical engine. This is in keeping with the theoretical perspective of
active inference, wherein the neuronal precision-weighting processes
are described as “subpersonal,”20 to distinguish them from the more
conventional, affect-laden descriptions of these terms (e.g., “confidence”
or “motivation” is described as precision afforded to higher-order priors
such as an action policy). Nevertheless, the functional consequences
implied by these terms are comparable. For instance, daily life is replete
with examples where affordance of motivation is necessary for actions
with highly variable consequences (e.g., going to the gym, buying lottery
tickets). One objection to this “subpersonal” stance is that brains do not
compute or intend; it is the person with the brain who does such
computations and holds intentions. The mereological fallacy here is that
we ascribe functions of the whole (person) to its parts (brains or
neuronal units). Although detailed counterpoints against this objection
can be found elsewhere,76 it is important to ask when, if ever, can we
attribute the function of a whole to one of its parts. We can say “a car
moves” and “a wheel moves,” but we cannot say “a steering moves.”
We can also say “I drive a car,” but we cannot convey much by saying “I
drive a wheel.” In other words, for certain qualified functions, the use of
intentional predicates for certain parts is agreeable. Furthermore, if we
consider human intention as a socially emergent phenomenon,77 it
cannot be ascribed to any single part (e.g., a neuronal unit) or even a
single person. In our view, these issues do not diminish the utility of the
proposal made here; nevertheless, they pose a far from trivial challenge
when applied to the philosophy of psychiatric practice.

capture interpersonal interactions 68 and brain–computer
interfaces69) offer tantalizing possibilities in this regard. Indeed, emerging insights on “interbrain synchrony” of
neural dynamics from healthy individuals have opened the
door for second-person neuroscience in psychiatry.70 Many
applications for investigating FTD can emerge from the advances being made in setting up (e.g., leader–follower experiments71), recording (e.g., functional near-infrared spectroscopy) and calculating (e.g., Granger causal models)
interbrain dynamics, some involving more than 2 interacting agents in a social context.24
Parameters of precision modulation can be obtained from
readily interpretable behavioural readouts such as eye movements (for example see Mirza and colleagues72); such readouts
can be acquired in conjunction with speech measures as a first
step to test general propositions linking precision modulation
and FTD. While concepts such as commitment to a discourse
plan do not have direct measures, the emerging application of
Natural Language Processing is already providing several in
direct means to estimate parameters of relevance (see Voleti
and colleagues73 for a detailed review). This will enable us to
acquire speech-derived measures of precision from snapshots
of social discourse. Controlled experiments on certain neurophysiological phenomena related to predictive processing (e.g.,
electroencephalography/magnetoencephalography correlates
of corollary discharge, mismatch negativity, certain evoked response potentials such as N400) can provide measures of “synaptic gain” reflecting the physiology of precision modulation.49
Further, using perturb-and-measure neuromodulation techniques like transcranial direct current stimulation and focal
transcranial magnetic stimulation, we can test brain-networklevel specificity for these hypotheses. Such studies have been
providing interesting leads to understand symptoms such as
auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia,74 and can also
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help uncover specific neurostimulation targets for FTD. The
conceptual relationship between the precision of action priors
and motivation raises the possibility that social incentives may
nurture the physiologic markers of “synaptic gain” (representing precision) and ultimately, verbal productivity itself.75 Appealing to precision dynamics also helps to explain why certain
therapeutic approaches (e.g., insight-oriented therapies, group
therapies) that demand one to infer and attune with another
person’s priors repeatedly fail in schizophrenia. Following this
line of investigation may potentially offer new therapeutic
speech and language approaches in psychosis.
Though active inference has provided biologically grounded
arguments to blur the boundary between “willing” and “acting” since the time of Schopenhauer, in its current edition,
active inference is still a theoretical framework (Box 2). At
times, this framework has been criticized as being too committed to the statistical notions of brain function, being somewhat
abductive and, to some extent, dismissive of more conventional
domain-specific neuropsychological concepts.78–80 While its
simplicity and physiologic plausibility have propelled its wide
applications,81 it is necessary to consider that empirical evidence is still lacking for many of its premises; for example,
“synaptic gain represents precision,” “neurons maintain representational codes for various aspects of the brain’s models of
the world,” “precision can be amplified at a subpersonal level,”
and “compensatory changes to balance precision weights occur
in pathological states” (see Keller and colleagues82 for a review
of evidence on neural implementation). Nevertheless, this heur
istic has been immensely useful for mapping observed psychopathology to brain functions. In the case of FTD, which con
tinues to elude neurobiological explanation, it offers a
principled entry into the “dark matter” of social neuroscience.83
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